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The Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the procure­
ment of the MX missile system in the late 1970s as part of 
the overall force modernization program. The MX was deemed 
necessary to augment the existing Minuteman III system 
because of its improved accuracy and hard target kill capa­
bility. During the past ten years, the DOD has studied 15 
possible basing modes. In 1983 President Reagan approved a 
plan to temporarily deploy 50 MX missiles in existing Min­
uteman III silos until a suitable basing system is devel­
oped.
This thesis examines a generic silo based MX system.
Two mathematical models will be designed. The emphasis of 
the first model is to minimize the system cost, with system 
survivability as a secondary consideration. The emphasis of 
the second model is to maximize the system survivability, 
with system cost as a secondary consideration. Both models 
are a function of the total number of silos in the system, 
the distance between silos, silo hardness, warhead yield, 
warhead circular error probable (CEP), and the number of 
warheads targeted per silo. Both models will be solved 
using geometric programming techniques.
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Analysis indicates that a closely spaced network of 
super-hardened silos provides the greatest survivability at 
the least cost. Both models were solved using a worse case 
scenario of each silo being targeted with six 550 kiloton 
warheads. The solution generated by the first model 
resulted in a system survivability of .5735 at a cost of 
$4,295,555,000. The solution generated by the second model 
resulted in a system survivability of .7570 at a cost of 
$11,545,140,000. Sensitivity analysis was conducted on both 
models to determine the affects of varying the number of 










2. OTHER MODELS USED TO SOLVE THE
MX BASING PROBLEM..................................15
3. MODEL FORMULATION.................................. 17
4 . PROBLEM SOLUTION....................................31
5. MODIFIED MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION..........4 3
6 . SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE ORIGINAL MODEL....... 50
7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE MODIFIED MODEL....... 89
8  . CONCLUSIONS........................................ 128
REFERENCES CITED..................... ..................... 130
APPENDIXES
A. DERIVATION OF THE EQUATION FOR SSPK.............. 132
B. DERIVATION OF THE YIELD SCALING CONSTANT
FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE............................13 8





6.1 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS............................ 53
6.2 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS...................   54
6.3 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS SYSTEM COST
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS............................55
6.4 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS............................56
6.5 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS............................ 58
6 . 6  NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS............................59
6.7 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS............................ 60
6 . 8  NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS............................61
6.9 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 550.KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 63
6.10 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 550.KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 64
6.11 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 550.KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 65
6.12 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 550 KILOTON WARHEADS.... .. ................... 6 6
6.13 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 6 8
6.14 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 69
T-3874
6.15 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 70
6.16 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 71
6.17 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................. 73
6.18 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS SILO HARDNESS
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................. 74
6.19 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................. 75
6.20 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................. 76
6.21 CEP VS DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS........................79
6.22 CEP vs SILO HARDNESS................................. 80
6.23 CEP vs SYSTEM COST................................... 81
6.24 CEP vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY..........................82
6.25 YIELD vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS..................... 85
6.26 YIELD vs SILO HARDNESS............................... 8 6
6.27 YIELD vs SYSTEM COST................................. 87
6.28 YIELD VS SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY....................... 8 8
7.1 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS    ..................... 92
7.2 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 93
7.3 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 94
vii
T-3874
7.4 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 100 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 95
7.5 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 97
7.6 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 98
7.7 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS........................... 99
7.8 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 250 KILOTON WARHEADS.......................... 100
7.9 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 550 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................102
7.10 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 550 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................103
7.11 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 550 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................104
7.12 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 550 KILOTON WARHEADS...............  105
7.13 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................107
7.14 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................108
7.15 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................109
7.16 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS...........................110
7.17 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................ 112
7.18 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................ 113
viii
T-3874
7.19 NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS SYSTEM COST
FOR 1  MEGATON WARHEADS............................ 114
7.20 NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS............................ 115
7.21 CEP vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS.......................118
7.22 CEP vs SILO HARDNESS................................ 119
7.23 CEP vs SYSTEM COST.................................. 12 0
7.24 CEP vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY.........................121
7.25 YIELD vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS.................... 124
7.2 6  YIELD vs SILO HARDNESS........................... 125
7.27 YIELD vs SYSTEM COST................................ 126
7.28 YIELD vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY.......................127
B.l Y vs k  .......................................... 142
B.2 ln(Y) vs ln(k).......................................143
B.3 ln(ln(Y)) vs ln(ln(k)).............................. 144





1.1 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED MX BASING MODES.................. 14
6.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 100 KILOTON
WARHEADS....................... ..................... 52
6.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 250 KILOTON
WARHEADS..............................................57
6.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 550 KILOTON
WARHEADS..............................................62
6.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR .750 KILOTON
WARHEADS............  67
6.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 1 MEGATON
WARHEADS..............................................72
6 . 6  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR GEP.................. 78
6.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR WARHEAD YIELD ..84
7.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 100 KILOTON
WARHEADS................... ......................... 91
7.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 250 KILOTON
WARHEADS..............................................96
7.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 550 KILOTON
WARHEADS.............................................101
7.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 750 KILOTON
WARHEADS.............................................106
7.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 1 MEGATON
WARHEADS.............................................Ill
7.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR CEP................. 117
7.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR WARHEAD YIELD...... 123




I wish to express my appreciation to my wife for her 
understanding and support during my two years of graduate 
school.
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. R.E.D. Woolsey 
for the knowledge and wisdom that he imparted on me during 
my time at CSM. I also deeply appreciate his patience and 
guidance during my endeavor to write this thesis.
I would also like to thank Mr. Mike Phelps of Science 
Applications, Inc. for his invaluable assistance during my 
research for this thesis.
Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my fellow 
officers and comrades in the CSM OR program. Without their 
friendship and support, I doubt that I could have survived 





The Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the procure­
ment of the MX missile system in the late 1970s as part of 
the overall force modernization program. The MX was deemed 
necessary to augment the existing Minuteman III system 
because of its improved accuracy and hard target kill capa­
bility.
In 1979 the DOD began a series of studies of the 
possible basing modes for the MX system. During the past 
ten years, 15 possible basing modes have been studied.
These are multiple protective shelter (MPS), split basing 
MPS, valley cluster basing, close spaced basing (dense 
pack), close spaced basing with concealment, widely spaced 
basing, southside basing, road mobile - soft, road mobile - 
hard, rail mobile, deep basing, submarine basing, surface 
ship basing, air basing, and existing Minuteman III silo 
basing.
Each basing mode was evaluated using three criteria; 
strategic capability, system feasibility, and political con 
siderations. Strategic capability includes the system's
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deterrence capability, hard target kill capability, ability 
to survive a first strike, and ability to be defended by an 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. System feasibility 
includes procurement cost of the system, time required to 
field the system, technology required to build the system, 
life cycle operational and maintenance costs of the system, 
geographical area siting considerations, environmental 
impact of the system, and impact on the local population in 
the siting area. Political considerations include the com­
pliance with existing arms control policies, impact on arms 
control negotiations the system will have, and the impact 
the system will have on US foreign policy (US Congress 
1982b).
The MPS system was selected as the baseline system in 
October 1979 by the Carter administration. This system 
entailed deploying 200 missiles among 4600 unhardened hori­
zontal shelters. The DOD planned to deploy this system in 
the Great Basin region of Nevada and Utah. The basing 
method involved constructing multiple shelter clusters, with 
each cluster containing 23 shelters. One MX and 22 decoy 
missiles would be deployed per cluster. Shelters would be 
hardened to 600 psi and be spaced approximately one mile 
apart. The system had several major drawbacks.
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Its strategic capability was questionable, as it had minimal 
capability to survive a first strike. This is because the 
system survivability depended primarily on deception, and 
not shelter hardness. The basic premise of this systems was 
that the US could construct two to three times more shelters 
than the number of Soviet warheads, thereby assuring some of 
the MXs would survive a first strike. However, to maintain 
survivability, additional shelters would have to be con­
structed as the Soviet stockpile of warheads increased. The 
MX system would also be difficult to defend with an ABM 
system because of the large deployment area. The system 
feasibility was questionable because of the huge land 
requirements needed. Approximately 12,000 to 15,000 square 
miles of land would be required to construct the baseline 
4600 shelter system, which posed a major environmental 
impact on the Great Basin. The total cost of the system was 
estimated to be $49.4 billion for deployment, and $77 0 mil­
lion per year for operating costs. Because of the major 
drawbacks of this basing mode, it was cancelled by President 
Reagan in 1983 (US Congress 1981).
The split basing MPS system was a variation of the base­
line MPS system. This system entailed basing half the sys­
tem in the Great Basin and half the system in the plains of
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western Texas and eastern New Mexico. Because of the 
increased cost (approximately 1 0 % higher than the baseline 
MPS system), and the expected difficulty of acquiring public 
land in Texas and New Mexico, this basing mode was not given 
serious consideration (US Congress 1981).
The valley cluster basing was another variation of the 
baseline MPS system. However, rather than deploy the system 
in cluster of 2 3 shelters, a single large cluster would be 
built in valleys of the Great Basin. This system would cost 
about $2 billion less than the baseline MPS system. How­
ever, this basing mode suffered the same drawbacks as the 
baseline MPS system, and was subsequently cancelled (US 
Congress 1981).
Close space basing was proposed in 1982. This basing 
mode entailed deploying 100 MXs in 100 super-hardened silos. 
The silos would be spaced approximately 1800 feet apart, and 
be hardened to 60,000 to 70,000 psi. The silos would be 
arrayed in a north-south linear grid one mile wide and 14 
miles long. This basing mode capitalizes on the affects of 
fratricide. Fratricide is the phenomenon by which the deto­
nation of the initial warhead targeted against a silo will 
destroy the adjacent and follow-on warheads. A dense pack 
array would maximize the affects of fratricide, as the
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expected flight path of Soviet ICBMs is over the North Pole. 
The Soviets would probably attack the southern silos first, 
and walk the barrage north. This attack method would cause 
the least amount of fratricide; however, it would still sig­
nificantly degrade the effectiveness of follow-on warheads. 
The strategic capability of this system is very good because 
of its excellent survivability. This system would also be 
easily defended by an ABM system because of the small 
deployment area. The system feasibility is questionable 
because of the hardness requirement for the silos. The US 
has the technology to construct a 70,000 psi silo, and scale 
models have been built and tested. However, it will prob­
ably be several years before a full scale prototype is con­
structed. The total cost of the system was estimated to be 
$26 billion for deployment and $293 million per year for 
operating costs. Congress cancelled this basing mode in 
1983 because they did not like the idea of having the entire 
MX force deployed in such a small area (US Congress 1982b;
US Congress 1984).
Close spaced basing with deception was a variation of 
close spaced basing. This basing mode entailed deploying 
100 MXs among 300 super-hardened silos. Survivability was 
enhanced because of the uncertainty of the location of the
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missiles. This basing mode was estimated to be $3 6 . 8  bil­
lion for deployment and $400 million per year for operating 
costs. Congress also cancelled this basing mode for the 
same reasons they cancelled the baseline densepack system 
(US Congress 1982b).
Widely spaced basing entailed placing 100 MXs in 100 
super-hardened silos deployed over a large land area. This 
basing mode offered fair survivability and deterrence capa­
bility. The major drawback to this system was its increas­
ing vulnerability as the accuracy of Soviets missiles 
increased. Also, being deployed over a large area would 
make ballistic missile defense more difficult. This basing 
mode was estimated to cost $28.9 billion for deployment and 
$300 million per year in operating costs (US Congress 
1982b).
Southside basing entailed placing 100 MXs in 100 silos 
deployed on the south side of mesas. This deployment strat­
egy capitalized on the protection offered by a mesa during a 
trans-polar attack of Soviet missiles. The basic premise 
was that Soviet warheads would impact short of the silo, 
allowing the mesa to absorb most of the blast. The major 
shortfalls of this were the limited deployment sites (mostly 
in the desert Southwest), and increasing vulnerability of
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the system as the accuracy of Soviet missiles improved.
Also, because of the wide dispersement, an ABM defense sys­
tem would be very difficult to deploy. The estimated cost 
of this basing mode was $27.6 billion for deployment and 
$3 00 million per year for operating costs (US Congress 
1982b).
The road mobile - soft system entailed placing 100 MXs 
on 100 wheeled transporters. The transports could either be 
dispersed among several military installations, or continu­
ously moved throughout the continental US on public high­
ways. This system offered outstanding survivability, 
because of the uncertainty of the missiles locations. This 
also, negated the requirement for an ABM defense system. 
However, because the transports were to be continually
moved, missile accuracy would be significantly degraded.
*This system was also manpower intensive because of the 
requirement for local security of the missiles, and 
increased maintenance incurred with a mobile system. The 
estimated cost of this system was $38.2 billion for deploy­
ment and $3 billion per year in operating costs (US Congress 
1981; US Congress 1982b).
The road mobile - hard system was a variation of the 
road mobile - soft system. The deployment concept was the
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same as the road mobile - soft system, but the transporters 
were armored. The estimated cost of this system was $4 5.7 
billion for deployment and $2.3 billion per year in operat­
ing costs (US Congress 1981; US Congress 1982b).
The rail mobile system was another variation of the road 
mobile system. The deployment concept was the same as the 
road mobile system. The only difference being that the mis­
siles would be transported in rail cars rather than wheeled 
transports (US Congress 1981).
The deep basing system entailed deploying 100 MXs in 100 
tunnels beneath mountains. This system offered outstanding 
survivability, as the missiles would be encased in several 
thousand feet of solid rock. Two methods of missile egress 
were proposed. The first was to deploy a boring machine at 
each site, and prior to launch an egress tunnel would be 
bored to the surface. The primary problem with this method 
was the time required to bore the egress tunnels. Excava­
tion of the tunnels would take at least several days. The 
second method was to have several pre-bored egress tunnels 
radiating from the main tunnel. This method solved the 
egress tunnel excavation problem, but created a new problem. 
The Soviets could target the egress tunnels, thereby render­
ing the MX system useless. Also, the limited number of
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suitable sites posed a substantial problem. The estimated 
cost of this system was $60 billion for deployment and $42 0 
million per year in operating costs (US Congress 1981; US 
Congress 1982b).
The submarine basing system entailed deploying 51 medium 
size submarines, with each carrying four externally mounted 
MX missiles. The submarines would be stationed at naval 
ports in the Gulf of Alaska, and on the east and west coast 
of the continental US. At any given time, 28 submarines 
would be at sea, with the capability to surging the remain­
ing fleet to sea in time of war. This system offered very 
good survivability, especially for the portion of the fleet 
at sea. The primary weakness of this basing mode is the low 
endurance of the system. The MX system would be totally 
inoperable 1 2  weeks after the wartime deployment of the 
fleet. This would be due in part to the destruction of a 
portion of the fleet by Soviet antisubmarine efforts. How­
ever, the majority of the MX system would be rendered inop­
erable by mechanical failure of the missiles. Since the 
missiles would be carried externally, an inoperable missile 
could not be repaired until the submarine returned to port. 
As the Soviets would undoubtedly target these ports, the 
submarine fleet could not return to port for repairs and
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refit. The estimated cost of this system was $32.08 billion 
for deployment and $716 million per year in operating costs 
(US Congress 1981).
Surface ship basing was similar to submarine basing.
This system entailed deploying 30 merchant container ships, 
with each carrying eight to ten missiles. Survivability for 
this system is the same as submarine basing. To ensure a 
high degree of missile accuracy the inertial guidance system 
would be replaced by a star tracker guidance system. This 
modification would be required because of the inaccuracy of 
a ships inertial positioning system. The estimated cost of 
this system was $32,714 billion for deployment and $887 mil­
lion per year in operating costs (US Congress 1981).
Air mobile basing was a concept of deploying the MX 
system on a fleet of 75 wide body jets, such as the Boeing 
747 or C5A. Each plane would carry two missiles and be 
deployed at Air Forces Bases in the interior of the conti­
nental US. These planes would be on 24 hour strip alert, 
capable of deploying within a few minutes of a nuclear 
launch alert. This system would provide excellent surviv­
ability, provided the planes could get off the ground prior 
to the impact of Soviet warheads. It is estimated that the 
time of flight for submarine launched ballistic missiles
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(SLBMs) launched from the US Atlantic coast to be 15 min­
utes, and 3 0 minutes for ICBMs launched from the Soviet 
Union. This would be sufficient time to get most, if not 
all, of the MX system airborne. However, once airborne the 
air fleet could remain aloft for only about ten hours, after 
which it must either land to refuel or attempt in-flight 
refuelling. As the Soviets would probably target most major 
US airports and Air Force Bases, and the majority of KC-13 5s 
would be deployed to support our strategic bombers, the DOD 
adopted a "use it or lose it" policy for this MX system.
This means that once the air fleet was deployed, the mis­
siles would have to be launched or lost. The estimated cost 
of this system was $23 billion for deployment and $1.3 
billion per year in operating costs (US Congress 1981; US 
Congress 1982b).
Deploying the MX system in existing Minuteman III silos 
was the quickest and least expensive alternative. This bas­
ing mode entailed deploying 50 MX missiles in modified Min­
uteman III silos at Warren Air Force Base. President Reagan 
approved this basing plan in 1983, and missile deployment 
was completed in 1986. This was considered an interim solu­
tion until a suitable basing mode was developed. During the 
past three years the MX system has been extremely vulnerable
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because Minuteman III silos are not hard enough to survive a 
Soviet nuclear strike (DAF 1984).
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a mathematical 
model of a silo based deployment system for the MX missile. 
This will be a generic model based on the yield and circular 
error probable (CEP) of Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, silo 
hardness, and distance between silos. I am designing a 
generic model to determine which of the two present silo 
based systems (MPS and dense pack) provides the greatest 
survivability at the lowest monetary cost.
1.3 Accuracy of Model.
The accuracy of the solution values for this model will 
be dependent on the accuracy of the parameters. Most of the 
parameter values are estimates, because the actual data is 
classified. These parameters include the cost functions, 
warhead yield, warhead yield scaling constant, and warhead 
CEP. The model is especially sensitive to the value of the 
CEP. During my research, I found estimates for the CEP of 
SS-18 and SS19 ICBMs ranging from 100 meters to 1500 meters. 
This is a relatively large range for CEP, which poses a 
significant accuracy problem. As I am forced to use unclas­
sified estimates for the parameters, the accuracy of the
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solution values will be questionable. Therefore, based on 
my research and personal knowledge, I selected values for 












MPS Poor Poor $49.4 bil.
Split basing MPS Poor Poor 54. 3 bil.
Valley cluster basing Poor Poor 47.4 bil.
Dense pack Excellent Fair 26.0 bil.
Dense pack 
with concealment Excellent Fair 36.8 bil.
Widely spaced basing Fair Fair 36.8 bil.
Southside basing Fair Poor 27. 6 bil.
Road mobile - soft Excellent Poor 38.2 bil.
Road mobile - hard Excellent Poor 45.7 bil.
Rail mobile Excellent Poor
Deep basing Excellent Poor 60.0 bil.
Submarine basing Fair Fair 32.OS► bil.
Surface ship basing Fair Fair 32.7 bil.
Air basing Poor Fair 23 . 0 bil.
Minuteman III silos Fair Excellent
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Chapter 2
OTHER MODELS USED TO SOLVE THE MX BASING PROBLEM
The US Air Force developed a model of the baseline MPS 
system in 1981. Phillip Mishins designed a model of the 
baseline MPS system for his masters thesis in 1983 (Mishins 
1983). Both models are virtually identical. The model and 
solutions follow.
Minimize: X 2(CM + CL + CT + C B) + 2 3 0 0 ^  X 4
+ Cw(i+ 4 ̂XiX3 + CAn(.643X3)2X l + C0X l + CDQX1-X2) 
Subject To:
100Xl- X lX 2 + .85NSX2<0 
2.8x 1013- X ^ 4<0 
X 2- X l<0 
X t> 1 0 0  
X 2> 100
5 0 0 0  < X 3< 10000
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The variables and parameters of this model are:
/ ^ N u m b e r  of s h e l t e r s
X 2 = N u m b e r  of M X  m is s i l e s
X 3 = D is ta n c e  b e tw e e n  s h e l t e r s  ( f e e t )
X 4 = S h e l te r  h a r d n e s s  ( p s i )
C M = Cost of each M X  m is s i l e  = $ 2 6 , 1 3 0 , 0 0 0
C T = Cost of each M X  t r a n s p o r t e r  = $ 8 , 1 7 0 , 0 0 0
CL = Cost of each M X  la u n c h e r  ( i n c lu d e d  in  m is s i l e  cos t )
C D = Cost of each decoy m is s i l e  = $ 5 2 7 , 5 0 0
CN = Cost o f  road  c o n s t r u c t i o n  = $ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 / m i l e
C 0  = L i f e c y le  o p e r a t i n g  cos t  = $ 1 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 / s h e l t e r
C i4 = Cost o f  la n d  a c q u i s i t i o n  = $ 0 / s q  f t
C s = Cost of each m a in te n a n c e  f a c i l i t y  = $ 5 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 0
N S  = S o v ie t  w a r h e a d s  t a r g e t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  s y s t e m  = 2 7 0 0  
The solutions of the model are:
Xi X 2 X  3 X  4 Cost
Air Force 4600 2 0 0 5200 600 $34,307




3.1 Variable and parameter definitions 
Decision variables:
X  i: Number of silos required for MX missiles
X 2‘ Total number of silos
X 3: Distance between silos (ft/road section)
X 4: Silo hardness (psi/silo)
Parameters:
Ci : Cost of decoy missile ($/decoy)
C 2: Silo cost ($/psi)
C 3: Life cycle operating cost ($/silo)
C 4: Cost of road construction ($/ft)
Ps: Percentage of MXs surviving a Soviet first strike
N: Number of Soviet warheads targeted against each silo
Parameter estimates:
The actual cost parameters are classified; therefore, I 
am using unclassified estimates.
Ci = $515,778/decoy (US Congress 1981)
C 2 ~ $3800/psi (US Congress 1982b; US Congress 1984)
C 3 = $2,930,000/silo (US Congress 1982b)
C 4= $130/ft (US Congress 1981)
ARTHUR LAKES LIBRARY 
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3.2 Objective function formulation
There are currently 50 MX missiles deployed; therefore,
X x = 5 0
This model allows for expanding the silo field to deploy 
decoy missiles. This enhances the system survivability 
because the Soviets will be unsure of which silos contain MX 
missiles and which silos contain decoy missiles. The cost 
of deploying decoy missiles is a function of the total num­
ber of silos in the system, and the number of silos required 
for the MXs. The decoy missile cost function is:
C ldX2-3 0 )
Total silo cost is a function of the total number of 
silos in the system and the hardness of each silo. The silo 
construction cost function is:
C 2X 2X 4
Life cycle operating cost is a function of the total 
number of silos in the system. The operating cost function 
is:
^  3 X  2
Road construction costs are a function of the total num­
ber of silos in the system, and the distance between each 
silo. The silo field which I am using is a linear grid 
pattern. The number of road segments is equal to the number
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of silos plus two road segments to join adjacent silo rows. 
The road construction cost function is:
3.3 Formulation of constraints 
Constraint 1:
The derivation of the equation for single shot probabil­
ity of kill (SSPK) and my reasoning for using the General 
Electric version of this equation are in Appendix A.
The General Electric equation for single shot probabil­
ity of kill (SSPK) is defined in (Battilega, Blackwell, and 
Phelps 1977) as:
Where:
Y is the warhead yield (megatons)
H is the target hardness (psi)
CEP is the circular error probable (nautical miles)
C 4(X2 + 2)X3 
The objective function is:
Minimize: c l (X2 - 50) + C2X 2X 4 + C3X 2 + C 4(X2 + 2)X3
Which can be rewritten as:
Minimize: c x (X2 - 50) + C2X 2X 4 + C3X 2 + C4X 2X 3 + 2C4X 3
(3.1)
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Using the fact that ’̂ij*_ Q-x\n{z), equation (3.1) can be 
rewritten as:
This transformation is required to facilitate a MacClau- 
ren series expansion of the exponential term of the equation 
during the problem solution.
The majority of Soviet ICBMs are SS-18 Mod. 4/5s and 
SS-19 Mod. 3s. The SS-18 Mod. 4/5 carries six 550 kiloton 
warheads and the SS-19 Mod. 3 carries ten 550 kiloton war­
heads (SIPRI 1987). These two missile classes account for 
approximately 73% (5240 of the 7200 warheads) of the Soviet 
ICBM stockpile (SIPRI 1987; DOD 1989). To simplify the cal­
culation of SSPK, I am assuming that only SS-18s and SS-19s 
will be targeted against the MX system.
The circular error probable (CEP) of Soviet SS-18 and 
SS-19 ICBMs is estimated in (Ball and Richelson 1986) to be 
260 meters. This equates to a CEP of 853 feet, or .14039 
nautical miles.
Replacing H with X 4, and substituting Y = .55 megatons 
and CEP = .14 039 nautical miles into equation (3.2) yields:




S S P K = 1 -g .14039 (3.3)
= 1 - G
-  1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7 * ;  7 (3.4)
The standard equation for hard target probability of 
kill (HTPK) for one warhead is defined in (US Congress 1984) 
as:
Where:
SSPK is the single shot probability of kill 
WSR is the weapon system reliability 
PTP is the probability of a warhead penetrating the 
airspace above a target.
Assuming that an antiballistic missile (ABM) system is 
not deployed in conjunction with the MX system, PTP = 1; 
therefore, equation (3.5) becomes:
The expansion of equation (3.6) for n warheads yields:
HTPK = 1 -{[1 - ( S S M 1)(l/S/?1)]x* • . x[l -(SSPKJ(l/S/? J]} (3.7)
Assuming that the initial warhead has a WSR of .9 and 
each succeeding warhead WSR is degradated .15 to account for 
the affects of fratricide, equation (3.7) becomes:
HT PK = 1 - [1 -(SSPK)(\SSR)(PTP)] (3.5)
HT PK = 1 -[l-(SSPKXWSR)] (3.6)
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HT PK = 1 -[( 1 - ,9SSPK)( 1 - ,75SSPK)(1 - .6SSPK)
(1 - ASSSPK'Xl - ,3SSPK-)(1- .15SSPK)]
1 -  [  1 -  , 9 (  l -  e - » » 8 - 3 4 4 3 7 X 4 - ^ J [ -  j  _  _7 5 ^ l _  e - 1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7 X 4 - - 7 ^
[  1 -  . 6 (  !  _  a - 1 9 » - B 4 4 3 7 X 4 - 7  )  ]  [  y _  ^  ^ - 1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7  X 4 - 7  )  j
[  1 -  .3( l _ e - 1 9 8 . S 4 4 3 7 x ; . 7 ^ | -  X . 1 5 (  j  _  g -  1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7  x ; .  7
l " [ . l  4. .9 e- 198S4437̂ " '7] [ .2 5 4  .Z S e '198 54437̂ " 7]
[ . 4 + .6 e- 198-54437Ar4 - 7] [ . 55 + .4 5 e- 198-5« 37^ 7]
[ . 7 4 .3G- 198S4437x;7] [ . 8 5 4. . i S e '198'54437̂  1  
[ - [ . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5  4- , 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e " 19854437X47
4-.21200625(e- 19854437X47) 24 ..36 75 3 7 5 (e- I98-S4437JC4 - 7) 3 
4- .2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 ( g '198'54437* 4' ' 7) 4 4- .0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 (e‘ 198 S4437X4'-7
4-. 0 0 8 2 012S( e * 198 S 4 4 3 7  x ;7 j 6 j 
-  .0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  .0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e '198,54437X4 7
-  .2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [g ‘ 198-54437jr47JZ-  .3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [e‘ 198-54437X4 7] 3
- .27540000[g'I98 S4437X4 7j 4  - .08474625[g"198'S4437X4 7J5 
-.00820125[e'I98S4437Jf47]s
( 3 . 8 )
( 3 . 9 )
( 3 . 1 0 )




The probability of one silo surviving is:
1 -HTPK  ( 3 . 1 3 )
The expected number of silos surviving is:
X 2 ( l -HTPK)  ( 3 . 1 4 )
The expected number of MXs surviving is:
SO
—  [ X 2 ( l - H T P K H  ( 3 . 1 5 )
& 2
Which simplifies to:
5 0 (  1 -  HTP K} ( 3 . 1 6 )
The expected number of MXs surviving can also be 
expressed as 50PS. Where P s is the percentage of MXs sur­
viving. The inequality for the survivability of MXs is:
50(\-HTPK)>50Ps ( 3 . 1 7 )
Which simplifies to:
1 - H T P K > P S ( 3 . 1 8 )
Which can be rewritten as:
P s + H T P K  <1 (3.19)
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Substituting equation (3.18) for HTPK into inequality 
(3.19) yields:
- I Ofl S4 4  ^Ps+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 - .0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e  4 ( 3 . 2 0 )
- . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [ e- 198S4437)i' * 7] 2 -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [ e' I98-54437;r« ' '7] 3 
-  . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e ' 198 S 4 4 3 7 X * 7 ] 4 -  , 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [ e~198 54437* 4'  7 ] 5  
- . 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [ e‘ 198S4437'r <7] 6 < 1
Constraint 2:
The equation for the peak overpressure of a nuclear 
blast from a 550 kiloton warhead is derived in Appendix B. 
The equation is:
/ > = 4 1 0 i r / ? ' 3 ( 3 . 2 1 )
Where:
P = peak overpressure (psi)
Y = yield (megatons)
R = distance from blast (kilofeet)
The assumption of a 15% degradation of WSR for each suc­
ceeding warhead results in a maximum of six warheads being 
able to detonate on any given silo. Targeting six warheads 
per silo is a worse case scenario. The Soviets typically 
target two warheads per silo (US Congress 1982a; US Congress 
1984). However, throughout my analysis I will assume a
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worst case scenario. I am also assuming that the Soviets do 
not possess the technology to synchronize the reentry and 
detonation times of warheads to conduct a time-on-target 
mass barrage of the MX system.
Substituting the circular error probable (CEP) for R 
will give the peak overpressure within the warhead CEP. This 
yields:
R = 853  ft = ,853k ft 
Substituting Y = .55 megatons and R = .853 kilofeet into 
equation (3.21) yields:
P = 4101 ( . 5 5 ) ( . 8 5 3 ) ' 3 ( 3 . 2 2 )
Which simplifies to:
P = 3 6 3 4 .3 2  ( 3 . 2 3 )
This means that the peak overpressure against a single 
silo from the detonation of one 550 KT warhead with a CEP of 
853 feet is 3634.32 psi. Therefore, the peak overpressure 
of six warheads is 21806 psi.
If the hardness of a silo is greater than or equal to 
the peak overpressure of a nuclear blast, then the silo will 
survive the attack. This leads to:
X 4 > 2 1 8 0 6  ( 3 . 2 4 )
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Which can be rewritten as:
2 1 8 0 6 X ; 1 < 1 ( 3 . 2 5 )
Constraint 3:
Missile silos should be sited far enough apart so that 
the blast causing a catastrophic kill of one silo will not 
destroy the adjacent silos. This is a function of the war­
head lethal radius.
Lethal radius is the distance from the blast that any 
target is destroyed if the overpressure of the blast is 
greater than the hardness of the target (Battilega and 
Grange 1978). Therefore, adjacent silos should be sited at 
least two lethal radii apart.
The distance between silos can be expressed as:
LR is the lethal radius of one warhead.
X 3 is in units of feet, but LR is in units of nautical 
miles. Therefore, equation (3.26) must be rewritten as:
X 3>2(LR) ( 3 . 2 6 )
Where






Y is the warhead yield (megatons).
H is the target hardness (psi).
Substituting equation (3.28) into equation (3.27) yields:
60 76
Replacing H with X 4 yields:
X 3  > 6 0 7 6
( 2 ) ( 2 . 9 ) y
H .3 5
( 3 . 2 9 )
( 2 ) ( 2 . 9 ) r
I f
( 3 . 3 0 )
Substituting Y = .55 megatons into equation (3.30) yields:
X 3> 6076 ( 2 ) ( 2 . 9 ) ( . 5 5 )
I f
( 3 . 3 1 )
Which simplifies to:
Xr,> 2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7X -  .35 ( 3 . 3 2 )
Which can be rewritten as:
2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7 X 3 1 ^ 4  3 5  -  1 ( 3 . 3 3 )
Constraint 4:
An arbitrary lower bound of 100 feet is set for the dis­
tance between silos. This is an estimate based on the phys­
ical size of a silo. This leads to:
X 3> 100 (3.34)
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Which can be rewritten as:
1 0 0 ^ 3 *  < 1 ( 3 . 3 5 )
Constraint 5:
An upper bound of 264 00 feet (five miles) is set for the 
distance between silos. This bound was arbitrarily set to 
conserve land use. This leads to:
X 3 < 2 6 4 0 0  ( 3 . 3 6 )
Which can be rewritten as:
3 .7 8 8 X  1 0 ' SX 3 < 1 ( 3 . 3 7 )
Constraint 6 :
Based on current U.S. technology, the maximum hardness 
for silo construction is estimated to be 60,000 psi (US Con­
gress 1984). This leads to:
X 4 < 6 0 0 0 0  ( 3 . 3 8 )
4
Which can be rewritten as:
1 .66 6 7 X  1 0 "SX 4 < 1 ( 3 . 3 9 )
Constraint 7:
The number of silos constructed must be greater than or 
equal to the number of missiles deployed; therefore:
X 2 > 5 0  ( 3 . 4 0 )
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Which can be rewritten as:
S O X j ' - 1 ( 3 . 4 1 )
3.4 Summary of the mathematical model 
Minimize:
C 1(X2-50)-hC 2X 2X 4-hC 3X 2^ C 4X 2X 3-h2 C 4X 3 
Subject to:
P s + 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  .0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e " 198S4437X4~ 7 ( 1 )
-.21200625[e*198S4437Jt4'7]2- .3675375[e'198'54437,f4'7]3 
- ,2754000o[e"198 S4437'!f<7]4- .08474625[e'198 S4437X*?]S 
-.00820125[e-'98-S4437'r’7]6< 1
2 1 8 0 6 X ; ' < 1  ( 2 )
2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7 X ; ‘ A'V35< 1 ( 3 )
100A'3I<1 (4)
3 .7 8 8 X  l O ' ^ a  < 1 ( 5 )
1 .6 6 6 7 X  1 0 ' 5 X 4 < 1 ( 6 )
50X;'<1 (7)
Constraint 1 relates system survivability and silo hardness. 
Constraint 2 is the lower bound for silo hardness.
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Constraint 3 relates the distance between silos and silo 
hardness.
Constraint 4 is the lower bound for the distance between 
silos.
Constraint 5 is the upper bound for the distance between 
silos.
Constraint 6  is the upper bound for silo hardness. 
Constraint 7 is the lower bound for the total number of 





The mathematical model formulated in Chapter 3 can be 
solved using a nonlinear programming technique. Geometric 
programming will be used to solve the model. This method 
has several advantages over other nonlinear programming 
techniques, such as Zoutendijk's method of feasible direc­
tions (Himmelblau 1972). The primary advantage is that geo­
metric programming does not require the use of a computer. 
However, if a computer algorithm is used, computational 
experience will show later that the solution converges qua- 
dratically. Another major advantage of posynomial geometric 
programming is that the solution always converges to a 
global minimum, regardless of the initial solution vector. 
Also, the relative cost contribution of each term in the 





C l(X2-S0) + C2X 2X 4 + C3X z + C4X 2 + 2C4X 3 
Subject to:
Ps+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  . 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e " ,98'S4437X4“ 7
-.2.i20062s[e-'9a-54437X*~ 7]2- . s e / s s z s j^ -198-54437**''7]3
-.2754000o[e‘198'S4437X«''7]4- .08474625[e'198-S4437*<"7]5 
- .00820125[e"198 54437X->" 7]6 < 1 
21806*;' < 1 
28873.537*;'*; 3S < 1 
100*;' < 1 
3.788x 10~5*3 < 1
1.6667 x 10"5* 4 < 1 
50*;' < 1
Constraint 1 relates survivability and silo hardness. 
Constraint 2 is the lower bound for silo hardness. 
Constraint 3 relates the distance between silos and silo 
hardness.
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Constraint 4 is the lower bound for the distance between 
silos.
Constraint 5 is the upper bound for the distance between 
silos.
Constraint 6  is the upper bound for silo hardness.
Constraint 7 is the lower bound for the total number of
silos in the system.
The first step is to construct a sign table. A sign 
table is a table listing the sign of the power of each vari­
able in the 17 terms of the model. Each variable must bal­
ance for the model to be correctly formulated. That is, 
each row of the table must have at least one positive entry 
and at least one negative entry for the corresponding vari­
able to have an upper and lower bound.
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 1 0  1 1  1 2  13 14 15 16 17
X 2 + + + + —
X 3 + + _ _ +
X  4 +  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  +
If a given variable only balances in one term of one 
constraint, that constraint becomes an equality. X 2 only
balances in term 17? therefore, constraint 7 becomes:
X 2-50
T—3874
Substituting 50 for x 2' the problem becomes:
Minimize:
50C2X  4 + 52C4X 3 + 50C 3 
Subject to:
P a + 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  . 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e~ 198 54437X4 7 
- . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 s [ e‘ 198'54437Jf» ' '7] 2 -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [ e‘ l98'54437X" ' ' 7] 3 
-  . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e“ 198,54437,f4" '7] 4 -  . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [ e" 198 S4437;f 4" 7 ] S 
0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [ e‘ 198'54437X<' '7] 6 < 1 
2 1 8 0 6 X ; 1 < 1 
2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7X^1 X^'35 < 1
i o o x ;1 < 1
3.788x 10'SX 3 < 1
1 .6667 x 10'5X 4 < 1
The sign table now becomes:
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13
* 3 -
x 4 +  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  +
X 4 appears in constraint 1  as an exponent? therefore 
change of variable is required. The exponential term of
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first constraint (e-i98.54437x;7) will be replaced with
A new constraint is required to take into account the 
change of variable. This constraint is:
1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7  X - . 74^5 - e (4.1)
This can be rewritten as:
X 5 < -------- 5---------7 ( 4 . 2 )
3 1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7  X 4e 4
19 8  5 4 4 3 7  Y ' 7An approximation of e 4 can be made using a
MacClauren series expansion.
Letting C = 198.54437, the expansion is:
ecx? ~ i + cx:-7 + + [-c*7J.3 + icx?x , (4.3)
4 2! 3! 4! 5!
[cx;-7]6 [cx;7]7 [ex;-7]8 [cx;7]5 [cx;-7]10H--------- h----------1----------y----------1------ - ---
6! 7! 8! 9! 10!
z'-' 2 y  - 1.4 /^3 y - 2 . 1  r' 4 y  -2.8 /->5 y - 3 . S
l + c x ; 7 + -------  —  + ------ —  + -------—  + ------ —  ( 4 . 4 )
4 2 6 24  120
6 y  — 4 .2  f" 7 y  — 4 .9  /-> 8  y —5 .6  o 9  y  — 6 .3  /— 10 y ~  7 .0
C-* 4> O  / i  a  y \  a  w  y \  a  L /  s\ a
720 5 0 4 0  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
Using the fact that the arithmetic mean of an expression 
is greater than the geometric mean as defined in (Woolsey 
1988), a multiple term expression can be transformed into a
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single term expression by a process called condensation. 
The condensation of equation (4.4) results in:
. « ; y  i V Y m  c n  v  £ i y Y _ £ i y Y _ £ ! _ y  (4.5)U J  V62J V26 3 J [ 6  6 j  [ 2 4 d J   ̂1206 J
( c6 \b?f c7 V v  c8 V v  c9 V 10
\720b7j V 5 0 4 0  b 8 J V 4 0 3 2 0 6  g J \ ^ 3 6 2 8 8 0 6 10
10 \ u
36288006!
- . 7 5 2 -  1 .4 6 3 - 2 . 1 6 4 - 2 . 8 6 5 - 3 . 5 6 6 - 4 . 2 6 7 - 4 . 9 6 8 - 5 . 6  6 9 - 6 . 3 6 10- 7 . 0  6 u
1 1
This expression is true only if i- 1
Therefore:
16, = -- C  ^  X  ”   ̂ 3 — 2 .2  ^ 4  ^  — 2.8 ^  5 — 3.5 ^  6 ~ 4 .2 ^ 7  — 4.9 ^ 8  S. 6 ^ 9  ^  — 6.3  ^ 1 0  7.0
1 + 6  X  1 +   + —.....— + ——— +  +    —-h------------ 1-----------
' - ^  4 2 6 24  120 720 50 4 0  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
cx476.=
2 _ 7 czx 41-4 c 3x z 21 c 4x :28 csxz3S c6x ; 4 2  c7 x 449 cax 4s'6 c 9x 463 c i0x / °
1 + 6  X  a  ' +  +  — —  -+■ —  +  —  + ----------+ ----------+  +  - + -----
4 "  '  120 720 5 0 40  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
6o = \c2x4lA3 ^>2 ̂ — 1.4 ^ 3  ” 24 ^>4 ~2.8 ^ 5  ~3.5 ^ 6  ^ — 4.2 ^ 7  ^ — 4.9 ^  8 ~ S. 6 ^  9 ̂  — 6.3 ^  10 “ 7.0“ + "l l /-»Vr“ . 7 1 4 1 . ^ 4  l . / v 4 u ^ 4  1 . ^ 4  ^ ^  4 0 ^  41 + LA a  ■+■-  + ----
6. =
2 6 24  120 720 5 0 4 0  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
\c 3x ~42A
4 , c2x;14 c3x:21 c4x:28 c5x:3S c6x442 c 7x 449 cBx45-6 c9x463 c'°x470
1 + 6  X a ' 4~ ........ + ————̂  + -------- + — + ■ + — —  + ■ + — + 1 "■
4 2 6 2 4  120 720 50 4 0  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
1 r* 4  -y  -  2 .8
g  =  ______________________________________________________ 24 __________________________________________________________
s 7 C2X~7* C3X~21 C4XZ28 CSXZ3S c6xZ42 c7x~49 C8*;5-6 c9x 463 cl0x-4701 + CXI + — -— + — -— + ----+---- +---- + ---- + -----+ — —  +
2 6 24  120 720 5 0 4 0  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
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o, =
6 _ 7 czx 4l 4 c3x 4zl c4x 4za cax 435 c 6xz4Z c7xi49 c ax 456 c 9 x 46 3  c l0x 470
1 +  C  _X" 4 ’ +  — +  — — —  ■+■ — — — ■+■ — ——  4- —" 4- ' 4--------------------- -4- —— —  4- ■4 2 6 24  120 720 5 0 40  4 0 3 2 0  3 6 2 8 8 0  3 6 2 8 8 0 0
X°7:-------_ 7 czx414 c3xzZA c4xzza Csx 3-5 c6xz4Z c7xz49 c8x;S6 c9x463 cl0x470




1 + CX -.74 c*x: cJx\
4 v - 2  8 4C X S V-3.S 4CaX c°x: 7 v -4.9 4cf x c°x: 9 v -6.3 4cvx
24 120 720 50 40 4 0 3 2 0 3 6 2 8 8 0 3 6 2 8 8 0 0
1
6 9 = 4 0 3 2 0
c 8x : s-6
1 +  cx - .7 4 c“-x]
3 v-2-1Ĉ X 4 v  ”2.8 4c*x 5 v -3.5 4 6 v - 4.2C°X
24 120 720
7 v  ~ 4.9 r 8 r -S.6
+  1- +  4Cf X]
50 40 4 0 3 2 0
cvx4 -3
3 6 2 8 8 0
.10 v _7.0 
4c ,u x ;
3 6 2 8 8 0 0
362880 c9x :6-3








1 + C X  4 + — s1—
3 v-2.1 4
24




* 1 - 120 6
(  c °  r /  c
\ ^ 7 2 06 7 J  ̂5 0 4 0 6 p 4 0 3 20 6 ,
( 4 . 6 )
C 10
3 6 2 8 8 0 0 6 i i
Let:
K 2 = .7 6 2 + 1.463 + 2.164 + 2 . 8 6 5  + 3 . 5 6 6  + 4.267 
+ 4.968 + 5.669 + 6.3610 + 7.06n
( 4 . 7 )
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1 9 8 . 5 4 4 3 7 * ; '6 — A j A 4
5 1 9 8 .5 4 4 3 7  XZ’7e 4
X^< 1
k xx
Which can be rewritten as:
( 4 . 8 )
( 4 . 9 )
( 4 . 1 0 )
K xX\ 2X S<\
The model now becomes:
Minimize:
50C2X 4 + 52C4X 3 + 50C 3 
Subject to:
P.+ l- . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  . 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 X 5 -  . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 X J -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 X
( 4 . 1 1 )
(1)
-  . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 X g  -  . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 X g  -  . 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 X g  < 1
2 1 8 0 6 X ; 1 < 1
2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7 X j 1 X 4' 3 5  < 1





3.788x 10~SX 3 < 1 (5)
1.6667 x 10‘5X 4 < 1 (6)
K,XlKzX 5< 1 C O
Substituting:
C2 = 3 8 0 0
C 3  = 2 9 3 0 0 0 0  
C 4 = 130
into the objective function, the model now becomes:
Minimize:
1 9 0 0 0 0 * 4  + 6 7 6 0 * 3 +  1 4 6 5 0 0 0 0 0  
Subject to:
P,+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5  -  . 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 X 5  -  .2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5  X 3 -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 X 3 ( 1 )
- . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 ^ 5 -  . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 ^ ^ -  , 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 X § <  1
2 1 8 0 6 X ; ‘ <1 ( 2 )
2 8 8 7 3 . 5 3 7 X ; ' x ; ' 3S < 1 ( 3 )
IOOX 3 1 — 1 ( 4 )
3 . 7 8 8 X  1 0 " 5 X 3 < 1 ( 5 )
1 .6 66 7  x 10 ' 5 X 4 < 1 ( 6 )
X , X~4k*Xs ^  1 (7)
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The sign table of the model is now:
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13 14
X 3 + — — +
X 4 ■+■ - + -
X 5 _ _ _ _ _ _  +
X 5 does not appear in the objective function? therefore, 
it has no affect on the total cost of the system. Because 
of this, X 5 can be set to any value within its upper and 
lower bounds. Substituting the lower and upper bounds for 
X 4 into equation (4.3), the bounds for X 5 are:
. 8 3 3 3 2 7 6 1  < X 5 < .9 1 4 1 3 7 5 4
X 5 will be set to its lower bound of .83332761. Using 
the lower bound of I s will give the system survivability for 
the lower bound of X  4t which is a worst case scenario.
Reviewing the sign table, we see that both X 3 and X 4 
have positive entries in the objective function. This means 
that both contribute a positive value to the total cost of 
the system. Therefore, both X 3 and X 4 should be minimized. 
The first term of the objective function ( 1 9 0 0 0 0 X 4) contrib­
utes 28 times more to the total cost than does the second 
term ( 6 7 6 0 X 3). Since 1 9 0 0 0 0 X 4  is the dominant term, X 4 
should be set to its lower bound of 21806.
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Substituting ^ 4 = 21806 and X s=.83332761 into the model, 




P s + .4265 < 1 (1 )
8 7 5 X 3 * S 1 (2)
ioox;‘<i (3)
3.788X 10"SX 3 < 1 ( 4 )
At optimality, constraint 1 shows that /%=.5735. This 
means that the system has a 57.35% survivability rate.
As stated previously, the coefficients of X 3 in the 
objective function are positive; therefore, X 3 should be 
minimized.
Constraint 2 can be rewritten as: X 3>878
Constraint 3 can be rewritten as: X 3>100
Constraint 4 can be rewritten as: ^ 3 - 26400
Constraint 4 is the upper bound of X 3t and since we are 
minimizing, this term can be dropped from further consider­
ation.
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Constraint 2 dominates constraint 3; therefore, the 
lower bound of X 3 is 875.
Final solution:
ATj = 5 0
X 2 = 50  
X  3 = 8 7 5  
X 4 = 2 1 8 0 6
Cost — $4 , 2 9 5 , 5 5 5 , 0 0 0  
Survivability = .5 7 35
4.3 Conclusion
This model indicates that a dense pack deployment mode 
provides the best survivability at the least monetary cost 
for a silo based system. The system survivability is dic­
tated by the silo hardness for this model. In Chapter 5 the 
model will be modified so that the system survivability 





5.1 Variable and parameter definitions 
Decision variables:
Xii Number of silos required for MX missiles
X 2: Total number of silos
X 3: Distance between silos (ft/road section)
X 4: Silo hardness (psi/silo)
Parameters:
Cii Cost of decoy missile ($/decoy)
C 2 : Silo cost ($/psi)
C 3: Life cycle operating cost ($/silo)
C 4 : Cost of road construction ($/ft)
/v Desired percentage of MX missiles surviving
a Soviet first strike
N: Number of Soviet warheads targeted against each silo
Parameter estimates:
Ci = $515,778/decoy (US Congress 1981)
C 2= $3800/psi (US Congress 1982b; US Congress 1984)
C3 = $2,930,000/silo (US Congress 1982b)
C 4= $130/ft (US Congress 1981)
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5.2 Objective function formulation
The objective function for the modified model is the 
same as the objective function of the original model. The 
objective function is:
Minimize: c 1 (X2 - 5 0 )  + C2X 2X 4 + C3X 2 + C 4(X2 + 2)X3
Which can be rewritten as:
Minimize: c j (X2 - 5 0 )  + C2X 2X 4 + C3X 2 +  C4X 2X 3 +  2C4X 3
5.3 Formulation of constraints 
Constraint 1:
This constraint is the same as constraint 1 in the orig­
inal model. This constraint relates the system survivabil­
ity and silo hardness. In the original model the silo 
hardness dictated the system survivability (P). However, in 
the modified model, an inputted value of P will dictate the 
silo hardness.
- 1 OH E>44T7Y~'^
P s+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 - ,0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e  4 ( 5 . 1 )
- . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [ e - 1,8'S4437* 4 7] z -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [e ’ 198-S4437X<" '7] 3 • 
- . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e ‘ 1,8S4437Ar '̂7] 4 -  . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [e ' 198-S4437Jf" '  7 ] 5  
0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [e ' 198 54437J(«7] 6 < 1
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Constraint 2:
This constraint is the same as constraint 3 in the orig­
inal model. This constraint relates the distance between 
silos and silo hardness.
28873.537 X~3'X'4 35 < 1 ( 5 . 2 )
Constraint 3:
This constraint is the same as constraint 6 in the orig­
inal model. It is the upper bound for silo hardness.
1 .6 6 6 7 x  1 0 " 5 X 4 < 1 ( 5 . 3 )
Constraint 4:
This constraint is the same as constraint 7 in the orig­
inal model. It is the lower bound for the total number of 
silos in the system.
5 0 X 2 ^ 1  ( 5 . 4 )
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5.4 Summary of the mathematical model 
Minimize:
C l(X2-S0)+C2X 2X i+C3X 2+CtX2X 3+2C<X3 
Subject to:
- 19R 5 4 4 3 7  X  ~Ps+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  ,0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e  4 ( 1 )
- . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [ e ' 198'54437J(i 7] 2 -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [e - 198-54437;f47] 3
- . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e- I98S4437* ; 7] 4 - . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [ e - 198S4437* ^ ] S 
- . 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [ e' 198-:.5 4 4 3 7  AT
-.7
4 6 < 1
28873.537X;‘x; 35 < 1 (2)
1 .6 6 6 7 X  1 0 " 5 X 4 < 1 ( 3 )
S O A P 'S  1 ( 4 )
Constraint 1 relates system survivability and silo hardness. 
Constraint 2 relates the distance between silos and silo 
hardness.
Constraint 3 is the upper bound for silo hardness.
Constraint 4 is the lower bound for the total number of 
silos in the system.
This model is totally driven by system survivability. 
Silo hardness is dictated by a given survivability parameter
(P). In turn, silo hardness dictates the distance between
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silos. This is the reason for not placing any bounds on
5.4 Problem solution
Minimize:
C 1(X2-50) + C2X 2X 4 + C3X 2 + C 4X 2-h2C4X 3 
Subject to:
P s+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 -  . 0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e~198 54437X4~ 7
2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [e ' 198 5 4 4 3 7 )f* " 7 ] 2  -  . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [e ‘ I98-54437y* " '7] 3 
- , 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e - 198'S4437;f^ - 7] 4- . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [ e- 198S4437;f* " 7] 5 
- . 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [ e" 198S44371f4" '7] 6 < 1 
2 8 8 7 3 .5 3 7 X 3 1 X 4 3 5  ^  1 
1 .6 6 6 7 x 1 0 ' 5 A' 4 < 1 
50X2' ^ 1
Constraint 1 relates survivability and silo hardness. 
Constraint 2 relates the distance between silos and silo 
hardness.
Constraint 3 is the upper bound for silo hardness. 
Constraint 4 is the lower bound for the total number of 
silos in the system.
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The first step is to construct a sign table.
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11 12 13 14
X 2 +  +  - * - +  —
X  3 "+■
X 4 + +
If a given row (variable) only balances in one term of 
one constraint, that constraint becomes an equality. For 
example, X 2 only balances in term 14 (constraint 4)? there­
fore, constraint 4 becomes:
X 2 = 50
Also, X 3 only balances in term 12 (constraint 2); there­
fore, constraint 2  becomes:
X 3 -  2 8 8 7 3 .5 3 7 A" 4  3 5




1 9 0 0 0 0 X 4 +  1 9 5 1 8 5 3 5 3 . 4 8 X 4  3 5  
Subject to:
- 1 9 8  5 4 4 3 7  X ”'7P,+ 1 -  . 0 0 3 2 7 2 5 - .0 4 8 8 3 6 2 5 e  4 ( 1 )
- . 2 1 2 0 0 6 2 5 [ e- 198S4437̂ - - 7] 2 - . 3 6 7 5 3 7 5 [ e- 198S4437Jf« " 7] 3 
- . 2 7 5 4 0 0 0 0 [ e ‘ 198S44377f-*'-7] 4 -  . 0 8 4 7 4 6 2 5 [e ' 198S4437;f->"'7] 5 
- . 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 5 [ e- 198S44373'* '-7] 6 < 1
1 .6667X 10~SX 4 < 1 ( 2 )
The model is now in terms of only * 4. A one dimensional 
search method will be used to determine the value of * 4.
5.3 Final solution
For a worst case scenario of each silo being targeted 
with six warheads the results are:
X j  = 5 0
X 2 = 50
* 3 = 6 1 4
* 4  = 5 9 9 7 1
Cost = $11  ,5 4 5 ,  1 4 0 ,0 0 0  
Survivability = .7 5 7 0
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Chapter 6  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
THE ORIGINAL MODEL
This chapter will be broken into three sections. The 
first section will examine the affects of varying the number 
of warheads while the warhead yield and warhead CEP remain 
constant. The second section will examine the affects of 
varying the warhead yield while holding the number of war­
heads and the warhead CEP constant. The third section will 
examine the affects of varying the warhead CEP while holding 
the number of warheads and the warhead yield constant.
6.1 Sensitivity to varying the number of warheads.
This section will analyze the affects of varying the 
number of warheads targeted per silo. Five analyses will be 
conducted.
The first analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 1 0 0  kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The second analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant
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at 250 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The third analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 550 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The fourth analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 750 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The fifth analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 1  megaton while varying the number of warheads targeted 
per silo from one to six.
The above warhead yields were selected because they are 
the most common size warheads in the Soviet ICBM and SLBM 
stockpile (SIPRI 1987).
System survivability will be abbreviated SS in all tab­
les. The number of warheads targeted against each silo will 
be abbreviated WH in all tables.
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Table 6.1 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
100 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
1 50 50 1313 1349 $ 411,715,200 . 6970
2 50 50 1030 2698 666,144,300 . 6653
3 50 50 894 4047 921,563,900 . 6581
4 50 50 808 5396 1,177,326,000 .6633
5 50 50 747 6745 1,433,256,000 . 6768
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Table 6.2 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
250 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
1 50 50 1507 2177 $ 570,361,300 . 6240
2 50 50 1182 4354 981,841,300 . 5869
3 50 50 1026 6531 1,394,458,000 . 5786
4 50 50 928 8708 1,807,468,000 .5845
5 50 50 858 10886 2,229,672,000 . 6000
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
550 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
1 50 50 1638 3634 $ 848,094,500 . 5750
2 50 50 1285 7268 1,536,230,000 .5347
3 50 50 1115 10902 2,225,601,000 . 5258
4 50 50 1008 14537 2,915,400,000 . 5320
5 50 50 933 18171 3,605,408,000 . 5486
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Table 6.4 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
750 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
1 50 50 1683 4523 $1,017,248, 0 0 0 .5586
2 50 50 1320 9046 1,874,171, 0 0 0 .5174
3 50 50 1146 13569 2,732,365, 0 0 0 .5082
4 50 50 1036 18092 3,590,996, 0 0 0 .5146
5 50 50 958 22615 4,449,843, 0 0 0 .5314
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Table 6.5 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
1 MEGATON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
1 50 50 1721 5578 $1,218,074, 0 0 0 . 5446
2 50 50 1350 11157 2,275,510, 0 0 0 . 5026
3 50 50 1172 16735 3,334,243, 0 0 0 . 4933
4 50 50 1059 22314 4,393,425, 0 0 0 .4997
5 50 50 980 27893 5,452,829, 0 0 0 . 5168
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6.2 Sensitivity to varying the CEP.
High ranking U.S. Air Force officials estimate that each 
missile silo in the U.S. will be targeted with two warheads 
in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike (US Congress 1982a; 
US Congress 1984). This analysis will examine holding the 
number of warheads targeted against each silo constant at 
two and holding the yield of each warhead constant at 550 
kilotons, while varying the CEP from 3 00 feet to 12 00 feet.
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Table 6 . 6
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR CEP 
XI X2 X3 X4
CEP MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
300 50 50 614 60000 $11,506,500,000 . 0025
350 50 50 614 60000 11,506,500,000 . 0025
400 50 50 614 60000 11,506,500,000 . 0025
450 50 50 657 49506 9,557,185,000 . 5551
500 50 50 734 36090 7,008,611,000 . 5518
550 50 50 811 27115 5,303,860,000 . 5488
600 50 50 8 8 8 20885 4,120,760,000 . 5460
650 50 50 966 16427 3,274,175,000 .5434
700 50 50 1044 13152 2,652,522,000 .5411
750 50 50 1123 10693 2,185,839,000 . 5389
800 50 50 1 2 0 2 8811 1,828,732,000 . 5368
850 50 50 1281 7345 1,550,872,000 .5349
900 50 50 1360 6188 1,331,472,000 .5330
950 50 50 1439 5261 1,155,959,000 .5313
1 0 0 0 50 50 1519 4511 1,013,911,000 . 5296
1050 50 50 1599 3897 897,739,900 . 5280
1 1 0 0 50 50 1679 3389 801,832,400 . 5265
1150 50 50 1759 2966 721,975,900 .5251
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6.3 Sensitivity to varying the warhead yield.
High ranking U.S. Air Force officials estimate that each 
missile silo in the U.S. will be targeted with two warheads 
in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike (US Congress 1982a; 
US Congress 1984). This analysis will examine holding the 
number of warheads targeted against each silo constant at 
two and holding the warhead CEP constant at 853 feet, while 
varying the warhead yield from 100 kilotons (KT) to 1 mega­
ton (MT). The warhead yields used will be 100 KT, 250 KT, 
550 KT, 750 KT, and 1 MT. These yields were selected 
because they are the most common size warheads in the Soviet 









SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
WARHEAD YIELD
XI X2 X3 X4
MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost ss
50 50 1030 2698 $ 666,144, 300 . 6653
50 50 1182 4354 981,841, 300 . 5869
50 50 1285 7268 1 ,536,230, 0 0 0 . 5347
50 50 1320 9046 1 ,874,171, 0 0 0 . 5174
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Chapter 7 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
THE MODIFIED MODEL
This chapter will be broken into three sections. The 
first section will examine the affects of varying the number 
of warheads while the warhead yield and warhead CEP remain 
constant. The second section will examine the affects of 
varying the warhead yield while holding the number of war­
heads and the warhead CEP constant. The third section will 
examine the affects of varying the warhead CEP while holding 
the number of warheads and the warhead yield constant.
7.1 Sensitivity to varying the number of warheads.
This section will analyze the affects of varying the 
number of warheads targeted per silo. Five analyses will be 
conducted.
The first analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 1 0 0  kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The second analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant
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at 250 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The third analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 550 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The fourth analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 750 kilotons while varying the number of warheads tar­
geted per silo from one to six.
The fifth analysis will entail holding the warhead CEP 
constant at 853 feet and holding the warhead yield constant 
at 1  megaton while varying the number of warheads targeted 
per silo from one to six.
The above warhead yields were selected because they are 
the most common size warheads in the Soviet ICBM and SLBM 
stockpile (SIPRI 1987).
System survivability will be abbreviated SS in all tab­
les. The number of warheads targeted against each silo will 
be abbreviated WH in all tables.
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Table 7.1 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
100 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
1 50 50 348 59855 $11,521,300, 0 0 0
2 50 50 348 59831 11,516,740, 0 0 0
3 50 50 348 59943 11,538,020, 0 0 0
4 50 50 348 59927 11,534,980, 0 0 0
5 50 50 348 59916 11,532,890, 0 0 0
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Figure 7.2 
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Table 7.2 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
250 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
1 50 50 473 59836 $11,518,530, 0 0 0
2 50 50 472 59969 11,543,800, 0 0 0
3 50 50 472 59993 11,548,360, 0 0 0
4 50 50 472 59962 11,542,470, 0 0 0
5 50 50 472 59997 11,549,120, 0 0 0
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Figure 7 . 6  
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ARTHUR LAKES LIBBAH1 
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Table 7.3 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
550 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
1 50 50 614 59960 $11,543,050, 0 0 0
2 50 50 614 59985 11,547,800, 0 0 0
3 50 50 614 59972 11,545,330, 0 0 0
4 50 50 614 59991 11,548,940, 0 0 0
5 50 50 614 59980 11,546,850, 0 0 0
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Figure 7.12 
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Table 7.4 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
750 KILOTON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
1 50 50 681 59957 $11,542,930, 0 0 0
2 50 50 681 59977 11,546,730, 0 0 0
3 50 50 681 59960 11,543,500, 0 0 0
4 50 50 681 59966 11,544,640, 0 0 0
5 50 50 681 59998 11,550,720, 0 0 0
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Figure 7.16 
NUMBER OF WARHEADS VS SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
FOR 750 KILOTON WARHEADS
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Table 7.5 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
1 MEGATON WARHEADS
XI X2 X3 X4
WH MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
1 50 50 750 59955 $11,543,020, 0 0 0
2 50 50 749 59970 11,545,870, 0 0 0
3 50 50 750 59968 11,545,490, 0 0 0
4 50 50 750 59965 11,544,920, 0 0 0
5 50 50 749 59984 11,548,530, 0 0 0
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NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs DISTANCE BETWEEN SILOS











g S  59.97 








1 2 3 54 6
N U M B E R  OF W A R H E A D S
Figure 7.18 
NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SILO HARDNESS



















1 2 3 54 6
N U M B E R  OF W A R H E A D S
Figure 7.19 
NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM COST 
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NUMBER OF WARHEADS vs SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY 
FOR 1 MEGATON WARHEADS
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7.2 Sensitivity to varying the CEP.
This analysis will examine holding the number of war­
heads targeted against each silo constant at two and holding 
the yield of each warhead constant at 550 kilotons, while 
varying the CEP from 3 00 feet to 12 00 feet.
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Table 7.6
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR CEP
XI X2 X3 X4
CEP MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost SS
300 50 50 614 59995 $11,549,700,000 . 3282
350 50 50 614 59993 11,549,320,000 . 4333
400 50 50 614 59988 11,548,370,000 . 5227
450 50 50 614 59988 11,548,370,000 . 5963
500 50 50 614 59987 11,548,180,000 . 6562
550 50 50 614 59982 11,547,230,000 .7050
600 50 50 614 59989 11,548,560,000 .7448
650 50 50 614 59989 11,548,560,000 . 7775
700 50 50 614 59993 11,549,320,000 .8046
750 50 50 614 59979 11,546,660,000 . 8272
800 50 50 614 59951 11,541,340,000 . 8462
850 50 50 614 59978 11,546,470,000 . 8624
900 50 50 614 59976 11,546,090,000 . 8762
950 50 50 614 59998 11,550,270,000 . 8881
1 0 0 0 50 50 614 59929 11,537,160,000 . 8983
1050 50 50 614 59973 11,545,520,000 . 9073
1 1 0 0 50 50 614 59932 11,537,730,000 .9151
1150 50 50 614 59929 11,537,160,000 .9220
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7.3 Sensitivity to varying the warhead yield.
This analysis will examine holding the number of war­
heads targeted against each silo constant at two and holding 
the warhead CEP constant at 853 feet, while varying the 
warhead yield from 100 kilotons (KT) to 1 megaton (MT). The 
warhead yields used will be 100 KT, 250 KT, 550 KT, 750 KT, 
and 1 MT. These yields were selected because they are the 




SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 
WARHEAD YIELD
XI X2 X3 X4
YIELD MXs Silos Distance Hardness Cost
100 KT 50 50 348 59831 $11,516,740, 0 0 0
250 KT 50 50 472 59969 11,543,800, 0 0 0
550 KT 50 50 614 59985 11,547,800, 0 0 0
750 KT 50 50 681 59977 11,546,730, 0 0 0
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Chapter 8  
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis conducted in this thesis is for a generic 
silo based MX system. The results of this analysis indicate 
that a dense pack basing mode offers the greatest surviv­
ability at the least cost for a silo based system.
The original model generated the lowest cost system, 
with system survivability being a secondary consideration.
In the worse case scenario of each silo being targeted with 
six 550 kiloton warheads, the system survivability was still 
.5735. This may appear to be a rather low survivability 
rate? however, senior ranking Air Force officials estimate 
that the current MX system (based in Minuteman III silos) 
has only a .10 survivability rate (US Congress 1985). The 
system cost averaged about $3.5 billion.
The modified model generated the highest survivability, 
with cost being a secondary consideration. The system cost 
averaged about $11.5 billion, which is comparable to the Air 
Force estimate of $26 billion for a dense pack system with 
100 missiles. Survivability for a worse case scenario of 
six 550 kiloton warheads targeted per silo was .757.
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Running the model with two warheads targeted per silo, which 
is the general Air Force assumption (US Congress 1982a; US 
Congress 1984), resulted in a .8633 survivability rate.
In December 1989, the Congress and DOD approved the rail 
mobile basing mode. Further research could be done on the 
rail basing mode, or on the road mobile basing mode.
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Appendix A 
DERIVATION OF THE EQUATION FOR SSPK
The dispersion pattern of warheads about a designated 
ground zero (DGZ) can be expressed as a bivariate normal 
distribution. The bivariate normal density function is 
defined in (Freund and Walpole 1987) as:
/ ( * . y ) ----------- 1 i
2noxoyV 1 - p 
Where:
c o v ( X , Y )p  -----------
O x Oy
X is the lateral distance from DGZ
Y is the longitudinal distance from DGZ 
Placing DGZ at the origin implies nx = ny = 0.
Warheads carried on ICBMs are usually released high 
enough in the atmosphere so that their final trajectory is 
vertical. This generates a circular dispersion pattern; 
therefore, ox = oy = a
Lateral and longitudinal targeting errors are indepen­
dent, which means that x and y are independent. Therefore, 
the covariance of x and y is zero. This in turn implies 
that p is zero.
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Taking the above factors into account, the bivariate 
normal distribution reduces to:
■ - w )
2  no/0.y) = :r— 2 e ‘ (̂ -1)
With a change to polar coordinates, the probability of a
warhead impacting within a given distance, z, of DGZ can be
expressed as:
2 2 it  r 2
P(P<z) = f I — e rdrdQ (A.2)
J J 2na0 0
The evaluation of equation (A.2) results in the proba­
bility of impact:
2z
P z= 1 -  e 2,2 (^4 .3 )
Circular error probable (CEP) is defined in (Battilega, 
Blackwell, and Phelps 1977) as the radius of a circle for 
which the probability of impacting inside the circle is .5. 
Setting P z = .5 and replacing z with CEP, equation (A.3) 
becomes:
(CEP)2
.5=1- e 2,2 (A A)
Solving for a2 gives:
gZ = S£inL M .5)
- 2  In ( . 5 )   ̂ J
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- 2 In(.5 ) can be rewritten as 2 In(2 )? therefore, equation 
(A.5) becomes:
= {A .6)2 In(2)
With a now in terms of CEP, equation (A.6 ) can be sub­
stituted into equation (A.3) to yield:
z\ iCEn21
Pz = 1- e L21n<2)J (>4.7)
Which simplifies to:
“ In ( 2 ) I” -Z— i\
P z = 1- g Ltcfi-) J (,4.8)
Single shot probability of kill (SSPK) is the probabil­
ity of a single warhead destroying a target given that the 
target is within the lethal radius of ground zero.
Therefore, equation (A.8 ) can be expressed in terms of SSPK 
as:
SSPK= 1- e‘lD(2)(c") (,4 .9)
Where LR is the lethal radius of the weapon.
Lethal radius is the distance from ground zero that any 
target is destroyed if the overpressure of the blast is 
greater than the hardness of the target (Battilega and 
Grange 1978). The lethal radius is a function of warhead
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yield and target hardness. The equation of peak overpres­
sure is defined in (Raizer and Zel'dovich 1966) as:
The energy of a nuclear explosion can be expressed as:
k is a yield scaling constant 
Y is the warhead yield 
Substituting equation (A.11) into equation (A.10) yields:
To determine the lethal radius, the peak overpressure 
component of equation (A.12) is replaced by the target hard­
ness and R is replaced by LR, which yields:
(>4.10)
Where:
P is the peak overpressure 
E is the energy released by the explosion 






H is the target hardness 
LR is the lethal radius of the blast 
Solving for LR we obtain:
( / 1 . 14)
Substituting equation (A.14) into equation (A.9) yields:
S S P K  = 1 - e"ln(2) (ir
CEP
( , 4 .1 5 )
Which can be rewritten as:
S S P K  = 1 -I i ( / 1 . 16 )
Where:
k is a yield scaling constant 
Y is the warhead yield 
H is the target hardness
CEP is the circular error probable of the warhead 
Equation (A.16) is a generic equation of SSPK. The 
yield scaling constant (k) is derived qualitatively from 
data collected during the above ground nuclear tests con­
ducted in the 1950's. Because this data is classified, I 
have no basis for calculating k. During my research, I
T-3874 137
found several equations for SSPK, all of which use different 
values for k. These values ranged from 1 to 24. Rather 
than arbitrarily selecting a value for k, which would prob­
ably result in a erroneous value for SSPK, I decided to use 
a published equation for SSPK. The General Electric 
equation for SSPK is widely used by defense consultants; 
therefore, I will use it in my analysis. This equation is 





DERIVATION OF THE YIELD SCALING CONSTANT 
FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE
The equation for the peak overpressure of an explosion is 
defined in (Raizer and Zel'dovich 1966) as:
Where:
P is the peak overpressure (psi)
E is the energy released by the explosion (ergs)
R is the distance from detonation (ft)
The energy released by a nuclear explosion can be expressed 
as:
E = kY (B. 2)
Where:
k is a yield scaling constant 
Y is the warhead yield (lb)
Substituting equation (B.2) into equation (B.l) yields:
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Rewriting equation (B.3) in terms of k yields:
The value of k can be derived from known values of P, Y, 
and R. In order to approximate a relationship between Y and 
k, a constant value of R = 5000 feet will be used. Two 
damage range charts and a pressure-distance curve in (Batti- 
lega, Blackwell, and Phelps 1977) provide some of the 
required data points.
For a 20 kiloton warhead the parameter values are:
P = 6.0 psi
Y = 40000000 lb 
R = 5000 ft
For a one megaton warhead the parameter values are:
P = 27.0 psi
Y = 2000000000 lb 
R = 5000 ft
For a five megaton warhead the parameter values are:
P = 100.0 psi
Y = 10000000000 lb 
R = 5000 ft
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Substituting the parameter values into equation (B.2) 
yields:
k = 18750 for a 20 kiloton warhead 
k = 1687.5 for a 1 megaton warhead
k = 1250 for a 5 megaton warhead
Assuming that the Soviets time the detonation of the 
warheads to obtain an air burst, (Glasstone et al. 1950) 
states that k will increase by a factor of two. Therefore: 
k = 37500 for a 2 0 kiloton warhead 
k = 3 375 for a 1 megaton warhead
k = 2500 for a 5 megaton warhead
The value of k for a one megaton warhead is estimated in 
(US Congress 1981) to be 3500. The discrepancy of the
derived value of k for a 1  megaton warhead and the value
stated in (US Congress 1981) is because k is estimated from 
data collected from experimental nuclear detonations. There 
is no empirical method to determine k.
The method I used to determine the value of k for a 550 
kiloton warhead follows:
1. The the three values of Y and k were plotted. The 
graph appeared to be an exponential function (see Figure 
B.l) .
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2. The values of ln(Y) and ln(k) were plotted. This 
graph also appeared to be an exponential function (see Fig­
ure B. 2) .
3. The values of ln(ln(Y)) and ln(ln(k)) were plotted. 
Once again the graph appeared to be an exponential function 
(see Figure B.3).
4. The values of In(In(In(Y))) and In(In(In(k))) were 
plotted. This graph appeared to be a linear function (see 
Figure B.4).
5. To confirm that the graph was linear, a regression 
analysis of the values was computed (see Table B.l). The 
results of the regression analysis confirmed that the func­
tion was linear. The regression equation is:
ln(ln(ln(/c))) = - .20331 ln(ln(ln(X))) + .874941
6 . Inputting Y = 550 into the regression equation 
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BASIC PROGRAM FOR CALCULATING 
VARIABLE VALUES
:lare sub m o d e l.a o :lare sub m o d e l.b oMON SHARED r 
[MON SHARED y 
[MON SHARED x31 
[MON SHARED x32 MON SHARED x41 
MON SHARED x42 
MON SHARED PSI MON SHARED PS2 MON SHARED n
= 515778 = 3800 = 2930000 = 130 
550 853 
6
- 50= 50 
tjt «NT "Decision Variables:"NT ii XI = 50 by default"NT it X2 = Number of silos"NT ti X3 = Distance between silos (feet)"NT H X4 = Silo hardness (psi)"
NT
NT "Parameters:"NT " (1) Cl = Decoy missile cost (Default $515,778/missile)"NT " (2) C2 = Silo cost (Default $38QQ/psi)"NT " (3) C3 = Operating cost (Default $2,930,000/silo)"NT " (4) C4 = Road construction cost (Default $ 13 0 / f t) "NT H (5) Y = Warhead yield (Default 550 kilotons)"NT " (6) R * Warhead CEP (Default 853 feet)"




(NT ii **** ENTER 'O' TO STOP INPUTTING CHANGES ****••NT rt:|jT "Enter the number of the parameter (1-7) to be changed: q
3 = 1 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of Cl: n; cl5 2 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of C2: it; c2
I = 3 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of C3: ii; c3I =S 4 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of C4: ii; c4
I = 5 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of Y: ii • / y
I = 6 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of CEP .. ii. r
I = 7 THEN INPUT "Enter the new value of N: ii . / n
I = 0 THEN GOTO begin) start
m:
y / 1000
„ MODEL.A , MODEL.B
. - cl * (X2 - 50) + c2 * X2 * x41 + c3 * X2 + (X2 +2) * c4 * x31
2 = cl * (X2 - 50) + c2 * X2 * x42 + c3 * X2 + (X2 + 2) * c4 * x32 « INT(PSI * 50)= INT(PS2 * 50) y * 1000
ATE 1/ Is PRINT "Warheads/silo = nATE 1, 25: PRINT "Warhead yield = y; "KT"ATE 1/ 54: PRINT "CEP = r; "ft"ATE 4, Is PRINT "ORIGINAL MODEL"ATE 4, 40: PRINT "MODIFIED MODEL"ATE 6, 3: PRINT "XI = 50"ATE 6, 43: PRINT "XI = 50"ATE 8, 3: PRINT "X2 = 50"ATE 8, 43: PRINT "X2 = 50"ATE 10, 3: PRINT "X3 = "; CINT(x31)ATE 10, 43 : PRINT "X3 = "; CINT(x32)ATE 12, 3: PRINT "X4 = "; CINT(x41)ATE 12, 43 : PRINT "X4 = CINT(x42)ATE 14, 3: PRINT "TEC = "/ teclATE 14, 43 : PRINT "TEC = tec2ATE 16, 3: PRINT "Survivability = "; PSIATE 16, 43 : PRINT "Survivability = "; PS2ATE 18, 3: PRINT "Number of MXs surviving = "; MX1ATE 18, 43 : PRINT "Number of MXs surviving = "; MX2
MODEL. A 
=  y  * 1 0 0 0
EXP(EXP(EXP<.874941 - .203319 k * y * n * ((r / 1000) * -3) 
h < 60000 THEN x41 = h 
h >= 60000 THEN x41 = 60000 
= 2.9 * (y A (1 / 3)) / (x41 A = 6076 * 2 * lr 
= r / 6076 = 1 - EXP((-1) * LOG(2) *
> x41 THEN sspk = 1
LOG(LOG(LOG(yld)))) ) )
.35)
( (lr / cep) A 2))
= 1 THEN htpk = 1 - (1 - .9 * sspk)= 2 THEN htpk = 1 - ( (1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk))= 3 THEN htpk = 1 - ( (1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 *= 4 THEN htpk = 1 - ( (1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 *= 5 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 *= 6 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 *= (1 - htpk)





rtl:x4 = 60000 TO 1 STEP -1 
= 2.9 * (y A (1 / 3)) / (x4 A .35) 
= r / 6076c = 1 - EXP((-1) * LOG(2) * ((lr / cep) A 2))i = 1 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk))i = 2 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk))i = 3 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 * sspk)4 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 * sspk)i = 5 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 * sspk)l = 6 THEN htpk = 1 - ((1 - .9 * sspk) * (1 - .75 * sspk) * (1 - .6 * sspk)
u = p + htpksum > 1 THEN GOTO start2 <T x4
irt2:
I « x4 + 1
x42 < 60000 THEN GOTO finish 
x42 >= 60000 THEN p = p - .0001 
a = 0 CO startl
lish:= 2.9 * (y A (1 / 3)) / (x42 A .
1 = 6076 * 2 * lr
2 = p
) SUB
